This paper re-examines the VAR evidence on the price puzzle and proposes a new theoretical interpretation. Using actual data and two identi…cation strategies based on zero restrictions and model-consistent sign restrictions, we …nd that the positive response of prices to a monetary policy shock is historically limited to the sub-samples that are typically associated with a weak interest rate response to in ‡ation. Using pseudo data generated by a sticky price model of the U.S. economy, we then show that the structural VARs are capable of reproducing the price puzzle only when monetary policy is passive.
Introduction
Structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) are widely used for measuring and understanding the e¤ects of monetary policy innovations on the aggregate economy. While most results in the VAR literature are consistent with economic intuition and macroeconomic theory, the typically found positive and signi…cant reaction of the price level on impact to a monetary policy shock is a fact that most monetary models have di¢ culty explaining. This anomaly, …rst noted by Sims (1992) and labelled "the price puzzle" by Eichenbaum (1992) , casts serious doubts on the ability of correctly identifying a monetary policy shock. If the central bank monitors and responds to a larger information set than that of the VAR, what is referred to as a policy shock is actually a combination of a genuine policy shock and some endogenous policy reactions. Sims (1992) argues that the central bank may have more information about future in‡ation than a simple VAR could adequately capture. The result of this omission is that a policy tightening in anticipation of future in ‡ation would be incorrectly interpreted by the econometrician as a policy shock. As long as monetary policy only partially o¤sets in ‡ation-ary pressures, the VAR would deliver a spurious correlation between a tightening of policy and a rise in in ‡ation, namely the price puzzle. Sims (1992) observes that the inclusion of a commodity price index in the VAR appears to capture enough additional information about future in ‡ation as to possibly solve the puzzle. This paper o¤ers a theoretically consistent explanation for the price puzzle using a small scale DSGE model and structural VARs. Earlier contributions have shown, using zero restrictions, that the price puzzle has been a distinctive feature of US data mainly before the appointment of Paul Volcker as Fed Chairman in 1979 (see Hanson, 2004) . In this paper, we show that the price puzzle emerges in the pre-1979 period also when the monetary policy shock is identi…ed using the sign restrictions implied by a standard sticky price model.
A number of contributions to the empirical literature on monetary policy have shown that a shift in the conduct of US monetary policy occurred in 1979 (Judd and Rudebusch, 1998 , Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 2000 , Boivin and Giannoni, 2006 , Lubik and Schorfheide, 2004 , Cogley and Sargent, 2005 , among others). 1 We therefore investigate the correlation between the empirical result of this literature about monetary policy and the empirical …nding about the price puzzle. Using a sticky price model of the U.S. economy as data generating process, we show that structural VARs on arti…cial data, based on either zero restrictions or modelconsistent sign restrictions, are capable of reproducing the price puzzle only when the central bank does not raise the interest rate su¢ ciently in response to in ‡ation. 2 The DSGE model, in contrast, does not generate, on impact, a positive response of the price level to a monetary policy shock, not even when monetary policy is passive. 3 A contribution of the paper is to show that the price puzzle can actually be a spurious correlation induced by the omission in the VAR of a variable capturing the persistence of expected in ‡ation, which is remarkably higher under the passive regime. The omitted variable problem is found to account quantitatively for the puzzling response of in ‡ation to a policy shock observed on actual data. Interestingly, our results show that the arguments in Sims (1992) are supported in the context of a structural model only when monetary policy is passive and thus multiple equilibria arise.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a re-examination of the empirical evidence using estimated SVARs in output, in ‡ation and the nominal interest rate. The following part describes the sticky price model used for the theoretical investigation. In Section 4, the dynamic responses of the theoretical model to a monetary policy shock are compared to the impulse responses of the structural VARs estimated on arti…cial data. The latter are shown to be systematically above the former under indeterminacy only, and to reproduce the sign and magnitude of the price puzzle observed in the pre-1979 period. Section 5 o¤ers a new interpretation of the price puzzle and shows that augmenting the SVAR on actual data with the in ‡ation forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters reduces signi…cantly the omitted variable problem that would emerge otherwise.
A re-examination of the VAR evidence
This section reconsiders the empirical evidence from the VAR literature and corroborates the notion that the price-puzzle is limited to a speci…c historical period. This period corresponds to the monetary regime that in the empirical literature on policy rules is associated with a weak central bank reaction to in ‡ation.
Consistent with the empirical literature on monetary policy shifts, we divide the postwar period around the third quarter of 1979, when Paul Volcker was appointed Chairman of the Fed and …ghting in ‡ation became a clear policy objective. The two periods are therefore 1966Q1-1979Q3 and 1979Q4-2006Q4 . The beginning of the …rst subsample corresponds to the date when the Federal funds rate was …rst traded consistently above the discount rate.
The choice of the break date is also supported by standard statistical tests. A Chow-test run on the reduced form federal funds rate equation in a VAR(4) rejects the null of stability with (2007) estimates a DSGE sticky price model augmented with a cost channel on U.S. aggegate data and shows that the estimated model is not capable of generating a price puzzle.
3 Following the literature, monetary policy is de…ned as 'active'('passive') when the nominal interest rate is moved more (less) than proportionally in response to movements in in ‡ation. The inability of the structural model to produce a positive response of price to a policy shock is conditional to the estimates in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) , which will be used below to generate the arti…cial data. For an estimated sticky-price model capable of generating a price puzzle under a passive policy regime, see Belaygorod and Dueker (2007) . a p-value equal to 0.006. 4
Zero restrictions
A possible way to identify the monetary policy shock is to adopt the recursive scheme put forward by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) and employ a Cholesky factorization of the variance covariance matrix estimated from the unrestricted VAR. With a lower-triangular structure, the ordering Y t = [y t ; t ; R t ] 0 implies that the measure of real activity, y t , is the most exogenous variable, the measure of in ‡ation, t , can respond contemporaneously to real activity only, whereas the instrument of monetary policy, R t , can respond contemporaneously to both in ‡ation and real activity. The last equation in the structural VAR is interpreted as a contemporaneous policy rule.
As for our variables, Giordani (2004) emphasizes that the inclusion of a measure of output gap reduces the biases that could otherwise arise when comparing predictions from a structural macro model and a VAR. Our measure of real activity is the CBO output gap, constructed as percentage log-deviation of real GDP with respect to the Congressional Budget O¢ ce potential output. The measure of in ‡ation is the annualized quarter-on-quarter GDP de ‡ator in ‡ation rate, while the policy instrument is the federal funds rate (average of monthly realizations).
The data were collected from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Figure 1 displays the impulse response functions estimated for the two subsamples with
VARs displaying a constant, no trend, and 2 (4) lags as for the …rst (second) subsample. 5 The reaction of in ‡ation to a unitary monetary policy tightening suggests a signi…cant di¤erence when moving from the …rst to the second subsample. The price puzzle is present during the pre-1979 regime only. Following the monetary policy tightening, the in ‡ation rate signi…cantly increases in the short-run, and maintains a value statistically larger than zero for a few quarters while reverting to its steady-state value. The responses of interest rate and output have the expected signs. Turning to the post-Volcker era in the bottom panel, we do not …nd any evidence of a price puzzle in that the in ‡ation reaction to a policy shock is not positive. In fact, it is negative on impact and then fades away fairly quickly. Importantly, such a response is far from being statistically relevant.
The estimated responses of the output gap and in ‡ation are hardly signi…cant in the second subsample, consistent with evidence obtained, among others, by Boivin and Giannoni (2006 Boivin and Giannoni, 2006, for empirical evidence supporting this interpretation).
In summary, Figure 1 shows that the price puzzle is statistically relevant in the pre-1979 subsample only. Barth and Ramey (2001) and Hanson (2004) point out that these results may be obtained also with VARs estimated with monthly data. Our evidence lines up also with the results in Giannoni (2002 and 2006) , and Barakchian and Crowe (2009) .
Furthermore, the …nding of a price puzzle in the 1970s appears independent from using real GDP or the output gap as a measure of real activity (see Castelnuovo and Surico, 2006 , for a battery of alternative speci…cations con…rming this …nding). While being possibly sensitive to the VAR speci…cation, we can safely state that the price puzzle evidence, if present, is much weaker in the second subsample.
A model-consistent identi…cation strategy: sign restrictions
The recursive identi…cation assumption is widely employed in the empirical macro literature, and the price puzzle obtained by Sims (1992) stems from a VAR in which the monetary policy shock is identi…ed via a Cholesky scheme. However, the new-Keynesian model does not imply a recursive relationships among output, in ‡ation, and the policy rate. In this section, then, we discuss the robustness of our results to using an alternative identi…cation scheme based on the sign restrictions implied by the New-Keynesian model presented in section 3. 6 We impose the restrictions that a monetary policy shock has a non-negative impact on the interest rate and a non-positive e¤ect on the output gap. It is worth emphasizing that unlike previous contributions, which rule out the price puzzle by assuming a non-positive in ‡ation response to a monetary policy shock, we deliberately leave the in ‡ation response unconstrained in an e¤ort to investigate and document the sub-sample regularity associated with the price puzzle.
As for the e¤ects of shocks to the Phillips curve and the IS curve, they are consistent with a typical aggregate demand and aggregate supply diagram: a disturbance to the Phillips (IS) curve has a non-negative (non negative) e¤ect on the interest rate and in ‡ation, and a non-positive (non-negative) e¤ect on the output gap. The reason for our choice of identifying other disturbances in addition to the monetary policy shock, while not crucial for the results, is twofold. First, we want to make sure that the matrix of contemporaneous parameters, which also identi…es the policy shock, does not produce responses of in ‡ation, output and interest rate to other shocks that are inconsistent with economic intuition and theory. Second, we wish to impose most of the sign restrictions implied by a typical DSGE sticky price model because this is the vehicle used in Section 4 to show that the price puzzle is the artifact caused by an omitted variable problem.
In Figure 2 , we present the impulse responses of the output gap, in ‡ation and the interest rate to a monetary policy shock. The price puzzle con…rms itself as an empirical regularity associated to the pre-1979 sub-sample. Relaxing the contemporaneous zero restrictions, in fact, ampli…es the puzzle in that the in ‡ation response now becomes positive also on impact.
By contrast, following a policy shock in ‡ation declines on impact over the post-1979 subsample and becomes also signi…cantly less persistent. 7
A framework for monetary policy analysis
This section investigates whether the apparent price puzzle may come from the (mis)identi…cation of the monetary policy shock during the regimes associated with a weak response of interest rate to in ‡ation. The vehicle for our analysis is a simple sticky price model of the kind popularized by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) , King (2000) and Woodford (2003) among others.
This model consists of the following equations:
and o¤ -diag = 0s (4) where x t is de…ned as the deviation of output from its trend-path, t represents in ‡ation, and R t is the nominal interest rate. In ‡ation and the interest rate are expressed in percentage deviations from their steady state values.
Equation (1) is a log-linearized IS curve derived from the household's intertemporal problem in which consumption and bond holdings are the control variables and represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, which in this model is the inverse of the relative risk aversion, i.e.
1 . There is no physical capital in this economy and therefore consumption is proportional to total resources up to an exogenous process g t . The latter is typically interpreted as a government spending shock or a preferences shock. 8
Equation (2) captures the staggered feature of a Calvo-type world in which each …rm adjusts its price with a constant probability in any given period, and independently from the time elapsed from the last adjustment. The discrete nature of price setting creates an incentive to adjust prices more the higher is the future in ‡ation expected at time t. The parameter 0 < < 1 is the agents'discount factor while relates detrended output, x t , and the stochastic marginal cost of production, z t , to the rate t .
Equation (3) characterizes the behavior of the monetary authorities. This is an interest rate rule according to which the central bank adjusts the policy rate in response to in ‡ation and the output gap. The reaction to in ‡ation may refer to contemporaneous realizationsidenti…ed by q = 0 -or expected future realizations -captured by q = 1. These adjustments are implemented smoothly, with R measuring the degree of interest rate smoothing. The random variable " R stands for the monetary policy shock, which can be interpreted either as unexpected deviations from the policy rule or as policy mistakes.
There is no correlation between innovations and their variance-covariance matrix is described in equation (4). Furthermore, all shocks hitting the economy are white noise. The last assumption has been deliberately designed to make transparent the e¤ect of indeterminacy on the persistence of in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations. Allowing for an autoregressive process for z t does not alter our conclusions. 9
4 Impulse response functions analysis
In this section, we investigate whether the small-scale monetary model detailed above is capable of reproducing the price puzzle. The model is parameterized using the estimates presented in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) . We employ the same identi…cation used for the structural VARs on two data sets generated under indeterminacy and determinacy. The procedure in the simulations is as follows:
1. Solve the model under both indeterminacy and determinacy, and generate two data sets of 55 and 109 observations including output gap, in ‡ation and interest rate. 10 8 The IS curve can be easily reinterpreted as a schedule explaining the behavior of the 'output gap'de…ned as the di¤erence between the stochastic components of output and the ‡exible price level of output (see Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 1999) . In this case, the shock gt is also a function of potential output variations.
9 Notice that the interest rate smoothing induces persistence of the endogenous variables in the reduced-form representation of the system. 1 0 The number of observations has been chosen to match the quarterly data points available from 1966Q1 to 1979Q3 and from 1979Q4 to 2006Q4, respectively. In each simulated sample, 100 extra-observations are produced to generate a stochastic vector of initial conditions, and then are discarded.
2. For each solution, estimate a reduced-form tri-variate VAR on the arti…cial data and impose the same identi…cation scheme adopted in the empirical analysis in Section 2.
3. Compute the variable responses to a structural innovations in the interest rate equation. 4. Repeat steps (i) to (iii) 10; 000 times and for each parameterization select the median structural IRFs.
To the extent that equilibrium indeterminacy can explain the price puzzle, the SVARs using data generated under this condition should reproduce, at least qualitatively, the stylized fact, and possibly generate structural IRFs that are within the empirical con…dence bands shown in Section 2. On the other hand, the SVARs using the data simulated under determinacy should not produce any puzzling response.
Parameterization
In order to implement Step 1, we need to calibrate the structure of the economy and the monetary policy rules to the history of the U.S. economy. As for aggregate demand and supply, we use the estimates of the New-Keynesian model (1)- (4) by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) , which are reported in Panel A of Table 1 . The only di¤erence relative to their model is that our speci…cation intentionally lacks any endogenous or exogenous persistence in the in ‡ation and output process. This choice re ‡ects the attempt to evaluate the ability of a quite forwardlooking model to generate persistence under indeterminacy. The …rst (second) arti…cial data set corresponds to the reaction function parameters under the heading Indeterminacy (Determinacy) in Panel B of Table 1 . In doing so, any di¤erence in the structural IRFs estimated on the arti…cial data sets can only be due to the variation in the Taylor rule (see Benati and Surico, 2009 , for a similar exercise on the Great Moderation). It is worth noting that the interest rate response to in ‡ation in the …rst row does not guarantee a unique RE equilibrium because = 0:89 violates the Taylor principle. 11 Hence, the parameters of the policy rule in this row generate indeterminacy while the parameters in the second row do not. To focus on the importance of a change in monetary policy, we keep all structural parameters of the model …xed across simulations with the exception of the coe¢ cients in the interest rate equation.
Evidence on changes in U.S. monetary policy: a brief review
A vast empirical literature has documented that an important change in the conduct of U.S.
monetary policy occurred at the end of the 1970s in that the nominal interest rate response 1 1 We postpone the presentation of the Taylor principle to Section 5. Under the passive policy regime, we follow Schorfheide (2003 and and we solve the model under the assumption that the impulse-response functions do not change discountinously at the boundary between active and passive regimes. This solution is labeled 'countinuity'. We obtain very similar results under the assumption of 'orthogonality' according to which the e¤ects of the structural shocks are orthogonal to the e¤ects of the sunspot shocks. 8 to in ‡ation became more than one-to-one. The policy reaction to output is typically found only marginally larger in the post-Volcker sample while the estimated degree of interest rate smoothing is higher in the most recent period.
These results are found by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) when taking the model presented above to U.S. data. In particular, they provide strong evidence in favor of i) indeterminacy in the pre-Volcker sample and ii) a signi…cant shift towards a more anti-in ‡ationary policy stance inducing equilibrium uniqueness when entering the 1980s. Given that we employ their model in our analysis, it is somewhat natural for us to borrow the parameter values from Lubik and Schorfheide's contribution.
It is worth stressing, however, that variations of the postulated policy rule appear to lead to the same qualitative results. While Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) assume a currentlooking policy rule to perform their full system estimations, Clarida et al (2000) and Judd and Rudebusch (1988) concentrate on single-equation regressions for a large battery of forwardlooking, backward -looking and current-looking policy rules.
As for the transmission mechanism, we note that variations of the standard sticky price model do not seem to overturn the evidence of a shift in US monetary policy. Boivin and Giannoni (2006) , for instance, employ a VAR similar to the one used in this paper and a DSGE model similar to the one used by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) : their minimum distance estimates support the improved monetary policy explanation of the great moderation. A similar conclusion is reached by Canova (2009). 12 On the basis of the available evidence, we model a shift from passive to active monetary policy. We assume a contemporaneous policy rule, i.e. we will set q = 0 in equation (3), and we will assess the robustness of our …ndings to employing a forward-looking policy rule, i.e. q = 1. Several interesting results arise. First, the model consistent in ‡ation reaction to the policy shock is negative on impact. After a few quarters, this reaction becomes mildly positive before converging smoothly to the initial level. Not surprisingly, we obtain an in ‡ation response which is very similar to the response estimated by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) . The DSGE model is not able of producing a price puzzle, though it is able to account under indeterminacy for the inertia of in ‡ation following a monetary policy shock. This suggests that the results in Estrella and Fuhrer (2002) , who …nd that purely forward-looking models are not capable of reproducing the persistent and hump-shaped responses to a monetary policy shock observed in empirical VARs, may be attributed, at least for in ‡ation, to limiting implicitly the solution of the model to the determinacy region.
Impulse response functions: DSGE vs. SVARs
The in ‡ation reaction from the recursive VAR on arti…cial data begins at zero by construction, depicts a fairly steep curve that reaches its peak at about 50 basis points after a couple of quarters, then starts converging towards the steady state. Indeed, this dynamic response represents evidence for the price puzzle being an artifact that stems from the failure of the estimated SVAR to correctly identify the e¤ects of the monetary policy shock under indeterminacy. Notably, this pattern is within (or close to) the empirical error bands of the in ‡ation response identi…ed using the recursive strategy on actual data. 13 The reaction of the federal funds rate to a policy shock is reported in the third column.
The estimated interest rate response from the SVAR on simulated data is shifted outward relative to the response implied by the DSGE model. This is likely to re ‡ect the fact that, because of the di¤erence of the in ‡ation IRFs, the systematic component of monetary policy responds to a higher level of in ‡ation in the recursive VAR on simulated data. In contrast, the response of the output gap is fairly in line with the structural model with the sole exception, by construction, of the zero contemporaneous restriction imposed in the SVAR. Indeterminacy in this model thus mostly in ‡uences the persistence of in ‡ation and the interest rate, whereas it does not seem to in ‡uence much the persistence of the output gap response.
The solution of the model under determinacy returns two sets of IRFs that are virtually indistinguishable. The New Keynesian model suggests an on-impact in ‡ation drop following a policy rate shock. After a few periods below zero, however, in ‡ation returns to its steady state value re ‡ecting the lack of endogenous in ‡ation persistence in the model. The response of output gap and in ‡ation in the estimated VAR are di¤erent, by construction, in the contemporaneous period only while the response of the policy rate very closely tracks the model-consistent IRF at all periods. 14 1 3 Importantly, the price puzzle arising under indeterminacy is not due to a small-sample bias, but instead to the misspeci…cation of the vector. In fact, we repeated the exercise with very large samples (10,000 observations), and still found clear (and incorrect) evidence pointing towards the price puzzle under indeterminacy. This result, not shown for the sake of brevity, is available upon request.
1 4 We veri…ed that this result does not hold true under "near indeterminacy", i.e. when monetary policy is active but very close to become passive. By contrast, the main message from these IRFs is unchanged using the alternative parameterization in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) . Moreover, we show in Castelnuovo and Surico (2006) that the results presented here are not overturned by introducing habit formation into the model.
Forward-looking Taylor rule
The "in-laboratory" exercises conducted so far have relied upon the current-looking Taylor rule estimated by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) . However, Clarida et al. (2000) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006) stress the relevance of the break in the systematic reaction to expected in ‡ation. One may then wonder how robust the results presented in Figure 3 may be to using a forward-looking rule. To tackle this issue, we repeat our exercise by assuming q = 1 in equation (3). As for the calibration of the parameter , we maintain 0:89, a value statistically in line with the one obtained by Clarida et al. (2000, price puzzle when, in fact, the unexpected interest rate hike induces …rms able to re-optimize to set lower prices. Interestingly, a forward-looking Taylor rule appears to trigger a more severe recession and a more marked de ‡ation. Under determinacy, the SVAR estimates track the dynamic reactions in the data generating process (solid line) remarkably well.
Mapping between data and theory: Sign restrictions
The exercise on pseudo-data is based on zero restrictions. While very popular in the empirical literature, this recursive identi…cation scheme is inconsistent with the structure of the sticky price model of section 3, and therefore it may make it more di¢ cult to isolate the source of the "simulated price puzzle".
To tackle this issue, we re-estimate tri-variate SVARs with pseudo-data by employing an identi…cation scheme consistent with the timing of our DSGE model. In particular, we impose the following sign-restrictions: a supply (demand) disturbance have a non-negative (non negative) e¤ect on the interest rate and in ‡ation, and a non-positive (non-negative) e¤ect on the output gap.
The …rst and second row of Figure 5 display the outcome of this exercise. In line with the results from the recursive identi…cation, the price puzzle emerges in Panel A only when monetary policy is passive. 15 Consequently, this evidence corroborates the view that the systematically larger response of the structural VARs relative to the model is not due to the mismatch between the timing of the DSGE model and the one imposed by the previously employed Cholesky identi…cation scheme. Under determinacy, which corresponds to a case where the VAR is correctly speci…ed and thus the policy shock is correctly identi…ed, the IRFs of the VAR based on sign restrictions track quite closely those of the DSGE model and the price puzzle does not materialize. When excluding the timing issue as a possible source of the simulated price puzzle, we are left with indeterminacy as the candidate for explaining the wedge between the DSGE model-based and the SVAR-based in ‡ation reactions to a monetary policy shock under indeterminacy. Given the popularity of the recursive identi…cation scheme in the literature, as well as the fact that the "price puzzle" has been mainly obtained by assuming a recursive economy, in the remainder of the paper we will mainly deal with SVARs estimated with a Cholesky scheme.
It is of interest to compare the impulse response functions obtained under determinacy with the two alternative identi…cation schemes discussed previously. Figures 3 and 4 reveal that imposing a zero restriction on the contemporaneous reactions of output and in ‡ation to a monetary policy shock introduces a hump-shaped pattern which is not present in the impulse responses of the DSGE model. In contrast, the identi…cation based on sign restrictions in Figure 5 is capable of reproducing the shape of the reactions in the data generating process.
This seems to suggest that the contemporaneous zero restrictions might be responsible for the empirical …nding in the recursive VAR literature of hump-shaped responses of output and in ‡ation to a policy shock.
Interpreting the price puzzle
This section explores the source of the systematic di¤erences between the IRFs of the sticky price model and the IRFs of the SVARs, and assesses the extent to which misspeci…cation can account for the price puzzle observed during the passive monetary policy regime.
The role of the omitted variable in the SVAR
In the simpler case where the central bank does not smooth the nominal interest rate ( R = 0), the three equation New-Keynesian model can be solved analytically. Woodford (2003) shows that the solution of the system (1)- (4) is a¤ected by the degree of systematic policy activism implemented by the monetary policy authorities. In particular, such solution is unique if and only if the following condition -i.e. the "Taylor principle" -is met:
If the constraint (5) is satis…ed, the dynamics of the economy only depend on fundamentals and it is possible to re-write output, in ‡ation and interest rate equations as a function of the structural shocks only. Under indeterminacy, in contrast, the transmission of structural shocks is altered and the system is augmented with a latent variable which is not present in the unique rational expectations equilibrium. Moreover, sunspot shocks may a¤ect expectations and, ultimately, the equilibrium of the economic system. In particular, Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) show that when monetary policy is passive the evolution of the endogenous variables 12 can be described as follows: 2
(6) where w 1;t 1 is a latent variable that follows the AR(1) process w 1;t = 1 w 1;t 1 + q t , and t N (0; 2 ) is a sunspot shock hitting the variables of interest. The sunspot shock may then hit in ‡ation expectations, consequently in ‡uencing current in ‡ation whose equilibrium path is described by eq. (6). The coe¢ cient 1 is the stable eigenvalue of the system (1)-(4) to the regime associated with an active policy rule. 16 While it is not possible to derive an analytical mapping between the series of w 1;t 1 and each variable in the system, it is worth exploring the extent to which, under indeterminacy, the omitted variable issue may be relevant for amending the price puzzle.
The role of omitted variables
When looking at the model (1)-(4), we may think of two di¤erent endogenous variables that are not explicitly and fully accounted for by our tri-variate VAR, namely in ‡ation expectations and output gap expectations. Indeed, expected in ‡ation and the expected output gap embed information about the monetary policy regime beyond the interest rate, in ‡ation and the output gap. In theory, the inclusion of any of these two variables, or of a linear combination of the two, could ameliorate the misspeci…cation problem. To assess the extent to which this is the case in practice, we run a battery of four-variate VARs in which a linear combination of expected in ‡ation and expected output gap enters as additional regressor. Our search reveals that the combination that ameliorate the price puzzle most is the one in which expected in ‡ation has weight one and expected output gap has weight zero. 17 Figure 6 plots the response of the output gap, in ‡ation and interest rate from the augmented four-variate recursive VARs where expected in ‡ation is ordered …rst in the vector of seriesỸ t = [E t t+1 ; y t ; t ; R t ] 0 generated from the baseline New-Keynesian model. The IRFs 1 6 As pointed out by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004, page 201) , under indeterminacy the number of stable eigenvalues is generally larger than under determinacy, i.e. fewer "states" wi;t 1 in eq. (6) are suppressed. Consequently, a richer autocovariance pattern may be expected.
1 7 These results, not presented for the sake of brevity, are available upon request. This …nding quali…es and extends Sims' conjecture about the mis-identi…cation of the policy shock in a mis-speci…ed VAR. In particular, expected in ‡ation matters not only for the ability of VARs to predict future in ‡ation but also, more importantly, for their ability to mimic the latent variable that arises only under indeterminacy. Our results therefore also provide a rationale for the …nding in Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005) that the inclusion of a latent factor (ordered …rst) in an otherwise standard three-variate recursive VAR can sensibly reduce the price puzzle over the full postwar sample.
Assessing the role of in ‡ation expectations
The previous results pose an important empirical question: 'What macroeconomic series can approximate in practice the omitted variable induced by a passive monetary policy?'. The New-Keynesian model used in this paper suggests that the omitted variable is indeed a product of the passive monetary policy regime. Equation (6) reveals that whenever this additional variable is omitted from the VAR, the identi…cation of the structural shocks is invalid in that, for instance, the innovations to the interest rate equation are not anymore truly exogenous;
rather they are a convolution of the monetary policy shock and a speci…cation error.
And, by neglecting this misspeci…cation, the incorrectly identi…ed policy shock has the ‡avor of an adverse supply shock in that, as shown in the …rst row of Figures To investigate the role of expected in ‡ation, we then run two four-variate structural VARs on actual data using the two identi…cation strategies based on the contemporaneous zero restrictions and the sign restrictions employed in the empirical section. For the recursive (lower-triangular) identi…cation, the vector of endogenous variables is ordered as follows:
represents the (mean value) of the one-quarter ahead GDP in ‡ation forecasts from the SPF. We focus on this time series because one-quarter ahead is the relevant horizon to forecast in ‡ation in the New-Keynesian model used in this paper. This contrasts with the signi…cantly positive response estimated with the tri-variate SVAR (see Figure 3) , and thus suggests that expected in ‡ation is indeed empirically important during the pre-Volcker regime. Second, the …nding that the in ‡ation response is statistically non-positive on impact is robust to the alternative identi…cation based on zero-restrictions.
The impulse responses in …gures 6 and 7 display some di¤erences. It is worth noting, however, that we focus here on the (puzzling positive) reaction of in ‡ation to a monetary policy tightening on impact. Furthermore, we have …xed the values of the parameters of the model rather than calibrating them so as to match the impulse responses. 20 Adding expected in ‡ation to the SVAR estimated over the sub-sample 1979Q4-2006Q4 produces IRFs, not reported but available upon request, which are virtually identical to the IRFs from the estimated tri-variate SVAR in the output gap, in ‡ation and federal funds rate only. We thus conclude that only when monetary policy is passive, in ‡ation expectations contain marginal explanatory power for in ‡ation and become helpful to identify a monetary policy shock. In Castelnuovo and Surico (2006) , we show that the results in this section are robust to using the Greenbook in ‡ation forecasts, which are prepared by the Fed sta¤ before each meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (see also Carboni and Ellison, 2009 ).
Conclusions
The contribution of this paper is twofold. At the empirical level, it corroborates the notion that the price puzzle is a sub-sample regularity related to the period that, in the empirical literature on monetary policy rules, is typically associated with a weak central bank response to in ‡ation. Table 1 . The point estimates of the Structural VAR on simulated data are based upon 10,000 repetitions. In each simulated sample, 100 extra observations are produced, and then discarded, to get a vector of stochastic initial conditions. Identification achieved through a Cholesky (lower triangular) factorization of the variance-covariance matrix using the following ordering: output gap, inflation and nominal interest rate. Quarters on the x-axis, percentage points on the y-axis. Table 1 with one-step ahead inflation expectations in the Taylor rule. The point estimates of the Structural VAR on simulated data are based upon 10,000 repetitions. In each simulated sample, 100 extra observations are produced, and then discarded, to get a vector of stochastic initial conditions. Identification achieved through a Cholesky (lower triangular) factorization of the variance-covariance matrix using the following ordering: output gap, inflation and nominal interest rate. Quarters on the x-axis, percentage points on the y-axis. Note: Solid lines represent the Structural model. The point estimates of the Structural VAR on simulated data are based upon 10,000 repetitions. In each simulated sample, 100 extra observations are produced, and then discarded, to get a vector of stochastic initial conditions. Identification achieved through a Cholesky (lower triangular) factorization of the variance-covariance matrix using the following ordering: expected future inflation, output gap, inflation and nominal interest rate. Quarters on the x-axis, percentage points on the y-axis.
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